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FUENTES V. SHEVIN:
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS V. PREJUDGEMENT REMEDIES
J. Martin Burke
"None of this seems worth the candle to me."' With those rather
brusque words of dissent, Mr. Justice White summarily dismissed the
majority opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin.2 Perhaps, as he suggests Fuentes
represents nothing more than "ideological tinkering with state law."3
However, even Justice White must concede that Fuentes is a decision of
consequence. Indeed, its potential impact covers a spectrum ranging
from a constitutional challenge of state prejudgment remedies to an
attack on long established credit and business practices.
On its face, Fuentes merely ruled that the replevin statutes of two
states violated due process. Seen, however, from the perspective of
three years of litigation over prejudgement remedies, Fuentes represents
a decisive, far-reaching Court decision. This note will analyze Fuentes
not only as a single important opinion, but also as the latest, and perhaps
culminating step in a process begun three years earlier. Fuentes' effect
on Montana law will receive special consideration.
FUENTES-THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
No discussion of Fuentes is meaningful without an analysis of
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.4 For Fuentes is a case with a past.
That past begins with Sniadach. Arising from the $31.59 in garnisheed
wages withheld from Christine Sniadach, the case marks the beginning
of a full scale attack on prejudgement remedies.
The Court in Sniadach examined the claim that Wisconsin's wage
garnishment statutes5 violated procedural due process. This charge
rested exclusively on the contention that procedural due process re-
quires an opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of property.
Wisconsin's garnishment statutes provided creditors with quick sum-
mary procedures.8  No prior hearing was accorded the debtor. Mr.
Justice Douglas delivered the majority opinion-an opinion whose con-
fusing and ambiguous language would result in three years of court
'Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 2005 (1972).
11d. [hereinafter referred to as Fuentes]. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
joined in the dissent.
8Id. at 2005.
'Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as
Sniadach].
rWisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.07(1) and 267.04(1), (1957).
6A formal action must be commenced against the debtor. The plaintiff must complain
that the defendant is indebted to him and is delinquent in payment. A writ of garnish-
ment is then issued. The defendant's wages are frozen from the time that the writ
is issued to the culmination of the main suit.
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controversies. 7 The major thrust of the Douglas opinion was confined
to a discussion of the specialized nature of wages and the injustices
made possible by prejudgement wage garnishment.8 As the Court noted,
to deprive a person of wages may be synonymous with "driving a wage
earning family to the wall." 9 In light of the hardships that might ensue
from the loss of wages, the Court ruled that due process requires that a
party be given an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of his
wages. 10
At the outset, Justice Douglas indicated that wage garnishment
procedures like those of Wisconsin might satisfy due process requirements.
To do so, however, the statutes had to be narrowly drawn to meet extra-
ordinary situations "requiring special protection to a state or creditor
interest."" Justice Douglas also briefly discussed the right to be heard.
Ultimately, however, the due process problems presented in Sniadach
were disposed of much too summarily. A more adequate articulation of
due process in the context of prejudgement remedies would have dispel-
led many of the questions raised in the wake of Sniadach. Was Sniadach's
rationale limited merely to wages? Were all necessities of life to be
protected as were wages by the fifth and fourteenth amendment require-
ments? If so, what standards should a court use to evaluate what con-
stitutes a necessity? What kind of property interests must be at stake
before one can invoke the protection of the due process clause? These
questions remained unanswered.
Following the announcement of Sniadach came a rash of cases chal-
lenging legally sanctioned extrajudicial remedies from attachments to
liens. As might be expected, the vagueness of Sniadach provided ammuni,
tion for both sides in the ensuing legal battles. Asked to declare "un-
constitutional" procedures which in some cases had roots in early com-
mon law,12 many judges hesitated and refused to extend Sniadach be-
yond the matter of wage garnishment. In their opinion Sniadach had
'Justice Douglas for example referred to an old Maine case, McKay v. Mclnnes, 279
U.S. 820 (1928). This per curiam decision of the Court affirmed a Maine decision
which had upheld the constitutionality of that state's attachment procedures. These
procedures permitted the taking of property without notice or prior hearing. Justice
Douglas' reference to the case, although attacked by Mr. Justice Harlan in his con-
curring opinion in Sniadaoh, nevertheless was construed by many judges and writers
as proof that Sniadach had merely carved out wage garnishment procedures as an
exception in the area of lawful prejudgement remedies. The Court in Fuentes remedies
the problem created by this reference to McKay v. McInnes by stating in footnote 23
of its Fuentes opinion (92 S.Ct. 1999) that ". . . as far as essential due process
doctrine goes, McKay v. MeInnes cannot stand for anymore than was established by
Coffin Bros. and Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) and Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S.
94 (1921). These latter cases both involved extraordinary circumstances as noted in
footnote 11 of this note and were cited in the per curiam decision as the authority
for the Court's action in McKay v. Mclnnes.
8Sniadach, supra note 4 at 340-341.
Old. at 342.
lId.
"The Court pointed out a number of exceptions to the rule that summary procedures such
as provided by the Wisconsin wage garnishment: Rtetlate . _ate_ prcecdirn du-c pr-
cess: Fahey v. Mallonee, 322 U.S. 245 (1947), action to protect against the economic
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merely carved out an exception in the realm of lawful prejudgement
seizures. The unusual nature of wages was the basis for the Sniadach
decision. That prejudgement remedies other than wage garnishment
violated due process because they failed to provide a prior hearing was,
according to these judges, an unwarranted extension of Sniadach.1 3
An equally great number of judges adhered to the opposite view.
Their construction of Sniadach led them to strike down general attach-
ment laws,14 claim and delivery statutes,' 5 innkeeper's liens,18 and sec-
tions 9-503 and 9-504 of the U.C.C.'7 In the view of these judges, Sniadach
had decreed that prejudgement remedies constituted a taking even
though goods were seized only temporarily. Thus, those remedies were
subject to due process requirements.
Into this tangle of conflicting constructions, the United States Su-
preme Court handed down further decisions in which the Court relied
on Sniadach for support. If anything Goldberg v. Kelly,'8 Bell v. Burson,'9
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,20 and Bobbie v. Connecticut,2' should have
served to indicate the intended broad scope of Sniadach. Each case
examined due process considerations. Taken as a whole, these decisions
certainly indicated the Court's assumption of a very firm position with
regard to the application of the procedural due process requisites of
notice and hearing. Any permanent or temporary deprivation of a signifi-
cant property interest was apparently to be treated within the purview
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In cases involving such de-
disaster of a bank failure; Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594
(1950), action to protect the public from misbranded drugs; Ownbey v. Morgan, 256
U.S. 94 (1921), foreign attachment to secure state jurisdiction; and Coffin Bros. v.
Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), prejudgement attachment in case involving a bank failure.
"Remedies such as replevin, innkeeper's liens, etc. were developed at common law.
"8Accord, Brunswick Corp. v. J. and P. Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970) (replevin
action against conditional vendee); Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Arizona 270,
463 P.2d 68 (1969) (Arizona wage garnishment statute held unconstitutional);
American Olean Tile Company Inc. v. Zimmerman, 317 F.Supp. (D. Hawaii 1970)
(laws authorizing garnishment of corporation checking accounts etc. do not violate due
process); Black Watch Farms Inc. v. Dick, 323 F.Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971) (pre-
judgement attachment of real property without a hearing is not affected by Sniadah).
"'Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971).
"-Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 258, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242 (1971); Laprease v.
Raymours Furniture Company, 315 F.Supp. 716 (N.D. N.Y. 1970).
16Klim v. Jones, 315 F.Supp. 109 (N.D. Calif. 1970); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp.,
338 F.Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F.Supp. 284 (E.D. Penn.
1970).
17Adams v. Egley, 338 F.Supp. 614 (S.D. Calif. 1972).
"Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Goldberg] (wel-
fare payments cannot be suspended until defendant is given an opportunity to be
heard).
"Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Bell] (deprivation of
driver's license under Georgia Motor Vehicle law is a violation of procedural due pro-
cess).
"Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (Wisconsin law authorizing the
posting of notices with regard to certain people's rights to purchase alcoholic bever-
ages was violative of due process).
"Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Boddie] (indi-
gent's attack on divorce proceedings expense).
[Vol. 34
3
Burke: Fuentes v. Shevin: Procedural Due Process v. Prejudgment Remedies
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1973
NOTES
privation, due process requires notice and a prior opportunity to be
heard.22 Thus, although not expressly stating it, the Court in Goldberg,
Bell, Constantineau, and Boddie more clearly enunciated the true scope
of Sniadach. Unfortunately, however, these cases did not deal with
creditor-debtor problems and related summary remedies. This perhaps
explains why, despite these decisions, lower courts continued to apply
Sniadach narrowly.28
FUENTES
In this context, Fuentes came before the Court. The outcome was
not surprising. Although Justice Harlan who concurred in Sniadach and
who wrote the majority opinion in Boddie was no longer on the bench,
five members of the Sniadach majority were. 24 The die was thus cast.
FUENTES--THE CASE
The Fuentes decision combined Pennsylvania and Florida cases.25
Both dealt with prejudgement replevin statutes. Procedural due process
was again the gravamen of the disputes. The Florida requirements for a
writ of replevin were three :26 (1) the plaintiff had to complete forms
stating that the defendant was wrongfully detaining certain goods;
(2) a bond in double the value of the property to be seized was required;
and (3) formal action had to be commenced against the defendant.
Upon compliance with these procedures, a writ of replevin was issued
by the clerk of the court. The writ authorized the sheriff to seize the
goods in controversy 7  If within three days, the defendant had not
sought the return of the goods by posting a counterbond, the sheriff
was authorized to deliver the goods to the plaintiff.28 Thus, on the basis
of an unproven assertion, a party was deprived of goods. The law af-
forded the defendant no notice or opportunity to be heard prior to the
taking. Pennsylvania's replevin statutes were substantially the same.29
The facts in both cases are rather commonplace. Mrs. Fuentes had
purchased a stove and a stereo from Firestone on a conditional sales plan.
A dispute arose between Mr. Fuentes and Firestone over the servicing
of the stove. Mrs. Fuentes refused to make further installment payments.
Firestone then sought and succeeded in obtaining a writ of replevin.
The stove and stereo were seized.
The Epps case joined the complaints of four appellants, three of
whom had suffered deprivation of property under circumstances similar
2Id. at 379.
'Epps v. Cortese, 326 F.Supp. 127 (E.D. Penn. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Epps].
inJustices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall and White. Interestingly, Justice White
wrote the dissent in Fuentes. Only seven justices, however, ruled on the case.
2Epps, supra note 23. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F.Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
2FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01, 78.07 (1941) [hereinafter cited F.S.A. 1941].2 F.S.A. 1941, §§ 78.08, 78.10.
-F.S.A. 1941, § 78.13.
EPA. STAT. ANN., Civ. and Eq. Rem. and Pro.. § 1921 (1 c6) .
PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of Civ. Pro., §§ 1071-1077 (1963).
1973]
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to Mrs. Fuentes. In their cases, a bed, a table, and other household
goods had been replevied. The fourth appellant complained that her
husband had obtained a writ of replevin whereby furniture, toys, and
clothes belonging to her son had been taken following a dispute over
the custody of the child. As in the case of Mrs. Fuentes, none of the
defendants in the Epps case had been afforded a prior hearing.
The defendants in both cases challenged the constitutional validity
of their states' replevin statutes. Failure to provide due process was
the basis for their attack. Three judge federal courts in Pennsylvania
and Florida upheld the statutes involved.
In both cases, the federal courts relied on a very restricted definition
of Sniadach. The Epps court contended that Sniadach and Goldberg had
carved out an exception based on necessity. Only the deprivation of
necessities required a hearing prior to the taking.30 The Fuentes court
relying on Brunswick Corporation v. J and P Inc.,3 1 held that Sniadach
was expressly a unique case involving a "specialized type of property
interest. '3 2 Sniadach's rationale was not to be extended.
FUENTE S-THE OPNINoN
After hearing the case in November 1971, the Court handed down
its opinion June 12, 1972. Both the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes
were declared constitutionally defective. The failure to provide notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to the taking of property was
fatal to the statutes involved.
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion. In a clear and
thorough discussion, the Court dealt with the nature of due process.
It reasserted that fundamental to due process is the right to be heard.
The purpose, of such a hearing is to protect individual property rights
from the "arbitrary encroachment" of government.3 3 As the Court noted,
a hearing in such cases serves to minimize the unjustified taking of
property. 4 It provides an individual the opportunity to speak in his
defense. It balances what would otherwise be a one-sided process favor-
ing the creditor.35 If the purpose of a hearing is to avoid unfair de-
privations of property, it follows that hearings must of necessity take
place before the property is ever taken. That a later hearing is provided
and that damages may be awarded in the case of wrongful taking can-
not undo the fact that the party has been deprived of his property.3 6
Furthermore, the basic right to a hearing is not negated by the fact that
the taking is only temporary.3 T
8*Epps, supra note 23 at 133-134.
tmBrunswick Corp. v. J. and P. Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
82Fuentes v. Faircloth, supra note 25 at 957.
8Fuentes, supra note 1 at 1994.
8ld.
851d.
8ld. at 1995.
37Id. at 1997.
[Vol. 34
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Rebutting lower court arguments in Epps, Fuentes v. Faircloth, and
many earlier decisions, the Court emphasized that Sniadach and Goldberg
had not carved out exceptions.3 Rather, procedural due process re-
quires a prior hearing not only before the taking of wages or welfare
benefits but of any interest encompassed by the fourteenth amendment.
According to the Court, any "significant property interest '39 falls within
this latter category. Thus, in the case before it, the Court ruled that
the appellants' possessory interests in the bed, table, stove, and stereo
were sufficient to invoke the protection of the fourteenth amendment.
Fuentes therefore established that, in general, statutes authorizing
the seizure of property without affording a prior hearing are uncon-
situtional. The Court, however, as it had done in Sniadach,4 ° noted that
in certain extraordinary circumstances statutes need not provide for a
hearing prior to the taking of property. The Court limited these extra-
ordinary situations to those involving three elements. 41 First, the statute
must serve some important governmental or public interest. Second,
the statute must be limited to "special situations demanding prompt
action." Third, the statute must require that an official participate in
the issuance of the writ and review the basis for the writ. In giving
these guidelines, Fuentes clearly established a standard for statutes
authorizing prejudgement remedies.
Fuentes thus represents a resolution of the controversies arising from
Sniadach. No doubt remains as to the Court's position on procedural due
process and its application to summary procedures. Sniadach has been
explained. Those decisions which construed Sniadach broadly appear to
have a new vitality.
FUENTES-A MONTANA APPLICATION
With the announcement of Fuentes, entire areas of statutory law
became subject to constitutional challenges. Confining the discussion of
Fuentes to Montana law, it appears that numerous sections of the Revised
Codes of Montana (1947) are vulnerable to constitutional attack.
R.C.M. 1947, §§ 87A-9-503 and 87A-9-504, two sections of the Uni-
form Commercial Code adopted by this state, are arguably unconstitu-
tional. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-503 authorizes a secured party, at the time
of a default to take possession of the collateral without judicial process.
R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-504 authorizes the secured party to sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of such property repossessed under the previous sec-
tion. As mentioned earlier, a federal district court in California in
Adams v. Egley,42 dealt with these same corresponding sections of the
81d. at 1998.
MId. at 1997.
"°Sniadach, supra note 4 at 342.
'Fuentes, supra note 1 at 2000.
'"Adams v. Egley, supra note 17.
1973] NOTES
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California Uniform Commercial Code. 43 That court ruled that in view
of Sniadach, both sections were unconstitutional as they failed to provide
an opportunity for a prior hearing. Given Fuentes, that conclusion ap-
pears irrefutable. The two sections of the Montana law like the Cali-
fornia sections are not narrowly drawn. They serve no special govern-
mental or creditor interests. They are not limited to situations requir-
ing prompt action. In general, they fail to meet the Fuentes' standards.
Thus, as these sections of the U.C.C. result in the taking of property
without a hearing, they almost unquestionably violate procedural due
process. If they are to remain viable, it is incumbent upon the legislature
to provide for hearings prior to such authorized seizures.
Montana's claim and delivery statutes found in R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-
4101 to 93-4119 are in like manner fatally defective on due process
grounds. These statutes provide that a private party may unilaterally
invoke state power by claiming that the defendant is wrongfully de-
taining property to which the plaintiff is entitled.4 4 Upon the execution
by two sureties of an undertaking in double the value of the property
taken, the plaintiff may require the sheriff to seize certain property
from the defendant. 45 If the defendant does not require the return of
the property within five days, the sheriff must deliver it to the plaintiff. 46
No notice or prior opportunity to be heard is accorded the defendant.
Undoubtedly, the claim and delivery statutes are too broadly drawn to
pass constitutional muster. They too, therefore, demand legislative re-
vision.
Just as California struck down its attachment laws following Snia-
dach,47 the Montana state courts in light of Fuentes would apparently
have to strike down Montana's attachment laws 48 were a proper case
presented. As with the claim and delivery statutes, a summary proce-
dure for attachment is provided in Montana. To attach the property
of another in Montana, a person need only:49  (1) sign an affidavit
stating that the defendant is indebted to him; (2) have two sufficient
sureties execute an undertaking in double the value of the property to
be attached; and (3) file a civil complaint against the defendant. A
writ of attachment is then issued and the property listed may be seized.
The defendant is thus deprived of property without prior notice or a
prior hearing. The attachment statutes are not narrowly drawn. There-
fore, they do not meet the Fuentes standards and are thus susceptible to
constitutional challenge.
Another area of Montana law which may now be assailed on
'
3 WEST CAL. COMM. CODE, §§ 9503-9504 (West 1964).
"IR.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-4102 - 93-4103.
'-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-4104.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 93-4110.
"IRandone v. Appellate Dept., supra note 14.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 93-4301 et. seq.R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-4301 - 93-4304.
[Vol. 34
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fourteenth amendment grounds is that of liens. A lien represents a
type of encumbrance upon property.50 It may be created by operation
of law or by contract.51 In the wake of Fuentes, those liens created by oper-
ation of law raise serious constitutional questions. Although not necessarily
resulting in a physical taking as in the case of attachment or claim and de-
livery, nevertheless a person's free use and enjoyment of property and
the power to dispose of property at will are unquestionably affected by
liens. The constitutional questions regarding liens have already been
raised in some states. As was noted earlier, in Klim v. Jones52 the Cali-
fornia innkeeper's lien statute53 was held unconstitutional on the grounds
that it failed to provide for prior notice and an opportunity for a prior
hearing. Montana has a similar hotel keeper's lien 54 providing for the
detention and sale of the property of guests who have failed to pay
rent. As in the case of the California statute, the Montana statute is
not narrowly drawn and does not provide a prior hearing.
Likewise agisters' liens and liens for service established by R.C.M.
1947, § 45-1106 are questionable. R.C.M. 1947, § 45-1108 provides that
if payment for work done is not made within thirty days, the party
entitled to the lien may deliver to the sheriff a statement containing
information as to the amount of claim against the property. The sheriff
is then authorized to sell the property and pay the complainant from
the proceeds. No notice or opportunity for a prior hearing is afforded
the alleged debtor in such a case. Again, a due process question may
arise. In conclusion, suffice it to say that just as these liens demand
careful re-evaluation in light of Fuentes, so may all liens authorized
by Montana law.
Fuentes v. Shevin thus portends serious consequences for Montana
law particularly with regard to prejudgement remedies. Legislative
action will be required to save many of the summary procedures present-
ly available. Given the formidible task of implementing a new state
constitution, the next legislature will probably not be able to deal with
the demands which Fuentes has imposed upon state law. Serious con-
sequences may await creditors as a result.
FUENTES-AN OVERVIEW
The significance of Fuentes is indeed many-faceted. For consumer
protection advocates, Fuentes is a victory of major proportions. The
required hearings may well provide a forum for consumer complaints
on a scale never before possible. For the creditor, Fuentes of necessity
means an end to a certain leverage that under the older procedures
-R.C.M. 1947, § 45-101.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 45-107.
'Klim v. Jones, supra note 16.
"WEST CAL. COMM. CODE, § 1861 (West 1954).
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 34-103- 34-111.
19731
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the creditor had on the delinquent debtor.55 Furthermore, hearing re-
quirements may demand more time from the legal departments of
business concerns with consequent higher costs of providing credit.
Thus, while the debtor can take comfort in the further protection pro-
vided him and his belongings, he may nevertheless find credit more
restricted and more costly. For state legislators, Fuentes means the
re-drafting of considerable parts of state law and the development of
a hearing process which will suit debtors, creditors, courts and Con-
stitution alike. Finally, judges will look upon Fuentes in terms of
greater demands on already busy schedules.
Reflecting again on the words of Mr. Justice White,"e perhaps the
added burden placed by Fuentes on the states is ultimately of little
worth. If of no other value, however, Fuentes does exemplify the Court's
concern with regard to individual rights. This judicial sensitivity has
prompted a re-evaluation of accepted legal procedures which often
compromise individual rights for procedural ease. As Fuentes demon-
strates, the Court is less likely to acquiesce in the deprivation of con,
stitutionally guaranteed rights. Thus, from the perspective of individual
rights alone, Fuentes is an important decision and a correct one.
6MSiladach, supra note 4 at 341.
5Fucntes, supra note 1.
[Vol. 34
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